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DOES  DOCKET  SIZE  MATTER?
REVISITING  EMPIRICAL  ACCOUNTS
OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT’S  INCREDIBLY
SHRINKING  DOCKET
Michael Heise, Martin T. Wells & Dawn M. Chutkow*
Drawing on data from every Supreme Court Term between 1940 and 2017, this Article
revisits, updates, and expands prior empirical work by Ryan Owens and David Simon (2012)
finding that ideological, contextual, and institutional factors contributed to the Court’s declin-
ing docket.  This Article advances Owens and Simon’s work in three ways: broadening the scope
of the study by including nine additional Court Terms (through 2017), adding alternative ideo-
logical and nonideological variables into the model, and considering alternative model specifica-
tions.  What emerges from this update and expansion, however, is less clarity and more
granularity and complexity.  While Owens and Simon emphasized the salience of ideological
distance across Justices as well as ideological distance separating the Supreme Court from the
lower federal appellate courts, results from our study, by contrast, suggest that when it comes to
ideological differences, intra-Court rather than intercourt ideological distance emerged, on bal-
ance, as critical.  Other variables also emerged as persistently important, notably Congress’s deci-
sion in 1988 to remove much of the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction and variation in
the total number of certiorari petitions filed.  Finally, these core findings appear robust across
alternative model specifications.  While most commentators react to a diminishing Court docket
by emphasizing possible adverse consequences, rather than commit to any normative position, our
Article instead considers both the possible institutional costs and benefits incident to a declining
Court docket, with an emphasis on structural horizontal separation of powers implications.
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nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at
or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors,
provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the
copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores factors that inform a persistent decline in the
Supreme Court’s docket size.  A secondary goal—and one more methodolog-
ically moored—relates to the comparatively new and growing “replication”
literature in the empirical legal studies genre.  To these ends, this Article sets
out to both replicate Owens and Simon’s 2012 empirical study of the Court’s
docket and then update and expand their study by broadening its scope from
2008 through 2017, exploring new variables, and considering alternative
model specifications.  By doing so, one can better assess the resiliency of
their earlier findings and see if the findings persist after examining a larger
number of Court Terms, variables, and empirical approaches.  This Article’s
particular substantive contribution, in turn, derives from the results of our
updated and expanded study and a discussion of how these results refine
Owens and Simon’s 2012 findings.  More specifically, Owens and Simon’s
2012 paper emphasizes that, among other factors, ideological differences
among Supreme Court Justices (“intra-Court” differences) as well as ideologi-
cal differences between the Court and federal appellate courts (“intercourt”
differences) informed changes to the Court’s docket size.1  Results from our
updated and expanded data set, by contrast, on balance imply something
slightly different and suggest that, when it comes to ideological differences,
what matters is intra-Court rather than intercourt ideological distance.  Nota-
bly, our core results are robust to alternative model specifications.
Part I introduces the scholarly discussion of the Court’s docket size as
well as time trends.  We examine how the Court sets its agenda as well as the
descriptive data on the Court’s trend over modern times to hear and decide
fewer appeals.  We then summarize the leading theories that seek to account
for variation in the Court’s docket size over time.  Part II summarizes the
existing empirical literature, identifies contested normative concerns flowing
from over the Court’s diminishing docket, and explains why replication stud-
ies matter, particularly at this moment in time for empirical social sciences.
Part III describes our data as well as our research design and empirical strat-
egy.  Part IV presents the results of our various multivariate models and con-
siders their possible implications.  We argue, in part, that unless the political
landscape becomes less polarized and delivers a less ideologically divergent
group of Justices—which is admittedly unlikely to happen anytime soon—we
should not expect the Court to suddenly reverse course and decide a materi-
ally larger number of appeals each Term.  Without a fundamental restructur-
ing of the current political landscape, the legal landscape for the Court, at
least in terms of its docket size, is unlikely to change significantly in the short
term.  Finally, we conclude by considering whether a smaller Court docket,
and perhaps regardless of the reasons for it, may not necessarily yield only
negative consequences.
1 Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1267 (2012).
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I. THE COURT’S SHRINKING DOCKET
  Today’s Supreme Court decides markedly fewer appeals than its predeces-
sors.  Since the 2005 Term, for example, the Court has decided, on average,
fewer than 78 appeals per Term, far fewer than the roughly 200 appeals it
decided during a few Terms in the mid-twentieth century.2  Presciently com-
menting on the Court’s docket depletion, Justice Douglas remarked more
than four decades ago: “I think the Court [today] is overstaffed and
underworked . . . .  We were much, much busier 25 or 30 years ago than we
are today.  I really think that today the job does not add up to more than
about four days a week.”3  In short, we are witnessing the “great disappearing
merits docket.”4
Figure 1 shows the number of merits appeals decided per Term, from
1940 through 2017, and makes unmistakably clear that the Court’s merits
docket has, on net, shrunk over time.  During the 1940s, the Court decided
roughly 177 appeals per Term.  During the 1950s, that number dropped to
approximately 124 per Term.  In the 1960s, the number rose to about 137
per Term, and by the middle of the 1980s, the Court heard slightly more
appeals.  The 1980s, as a decade, is the most recent high-water mark in terms
of the Court’s workload, with 167 appeals per Term.  Starting in the late
1980s and moving forward to the present, however, that number began to
drop precipitously.  By the 2000 Term, the Court decided only 87 appeals.
During the last Term included in this study, 2017, the Court decided 68
appeals, which represents the fewest number of merits decisions at any point
since the mid-twentieth century.
2 See infra Figure 1.
3 ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW
CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 119 (2006).
4 Kenneth W. Starr, Essay, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of Wil-
liam Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2006).
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FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF APPEALS DECIDED BY THE COURT,
1940–2017 TERMS5
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Sources: U.S. Supreme Court Database (2018) and Owens and Simon (2012) (updated).
If greater historical context is necessary to help frame this study’s time
period (1940–2017), Figure 2, with its even broader historical sweep, pro-
vides an even wider lens.  While illustrating the various ebbs and flows of the
Court’s docket since the late eighteenth century, one takeaway is that the
number of appeals decided during the Court’s most recent Term (68 in
2017) rivals the Court Terms leading up to the Civil War.6  And, of course,
the Court—and Justices—during the pre–Civil War era certainly did not ben-
efit from the full complement of clerks who assist the current Justices, to say
nothing of technological advances germane to workload efficiency increases
(e.g., computer word processing, electronic legal databases) that simply did
not exist during the mid-nineteenth century.
5 Figure 1 includes formally decided full opinion appeals, unsigned orally argued
appeals, and judgments of the Court.  The data were collected from the 2017 Release 01
data set of the United States Supreme Court Database. See Previous Versions of the Database,
SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php?s=2 (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).  The
smoothed line depicted in Figure 1 is a LOWESS smoother used to show general trends.
6 While Figure 2 extends only through the 2013 Term, data in Figure 1 include infor-
mation through the 2017 Term.
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FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF APPEALS DECIDED BY THE COURT,
1793–2013 TERMS7
Source: Empirical SCOTUS (2018).
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The possibility that the Court’s docket size does, in fact, matter helps
animate scholars who have undertaken the task of empirically exploring pos-
sible explanations for the steady decline of late.  While comparatively more
scholarly attention focuses on normative or theoretical aspects flowing from
the Court’s docket size—and changes to it over time—consistent with (and
evidence of) a larger trend in legal scholarship, some of the more influential
work in this area adopts an empirical analytical frame.
Owens and Simon’s (2012) paper represents the leading—and most
comprehensive—empirical exploration of the Court’s docket size and serves
as the starting point for our Article.8  Drawing from the same data set used in
this Article, Owens and Simon’s paper focuses on both ideological and con-
textual factors in an effort to empirically account for the downward trend in
annual Supreme Court decisions.9
In terms of ideological distance, Owens and Simon limited their study to
single measures for the intra-Court and intercourt dimensions, respectively.10
As both ideology distance factors achieved statistical significance, not surpris-
7 Figure 2 is a reproduction of a figure from the Empirical SCOTUS website. See
Decisions Per Term (Types), EMPIRICAL SCOTUS, https://empiricalscotus.files.wordpress
.com/2018/01/dectypes.png (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
8 Owens & Simon, supra note 1.  For other examples of helpful empirical work that
explores variation in the Court’s docket size over time, see, for example, Kenneth W. Mof-
fett et al., Strategic Behavior and Variation in the Supreme Court’s Caseload over Time, 37 JUST.
SYS. J. 20, 20 (2016).
9 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1263.
10 Id. at 1276.
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ingly much of their discussion dwelled on ideological aspects.11  Comple-
menting their ideological explanation for variation in the Court’s docket,
various contextual factors—notably, passage of the Supreme Court Case
Selections Act of 1988 as well as the presence of Justice White—similarly
proved influential in their account of the Court’s decreasing appetite for
deciding appeals.12
The discussion of their core findings emphasizes the political and ideo-
logical influences on the Court.13  As well, Owens and Simon’s normative
focus dwells on various “problems” that flow from the Court deciding fewer
appeals.  In particular, Owens and Simon suggest that a reduced Court
docket invites, among other challenges, increases in the number of “impor-
tant issues” that the Court will simply not resolve, inflation of the relative
importance and influence of “repeat players” before the Court,14 and a
decrease in the Court’s overall legitimacy.15
A. Prevailing Theories on Influences to the Court’s Docket
Perhaps Owens and Simon’s most important contribution involves their
empirical approach to a research question that has been dominated by
largely descriptive accounts in the past.16  By bringing data to an array of
leading theoretical accounts of the Court’s docket size, discussed briefly
below, Owens and Simon’s paper not only subjects these theoretical accounts
to real-world data and hypothesis testing but also contributes to a scholarly
foundation that benefits future scholars by helping identify new questions
and lines of research to pursue.17
1. Internal Factors and Court Composition
The Court’s own internal mechanisms, including, but not limited to,
Court rules governing grants to writs of certiorari, along with the Court’s
membership, form an obvious cluster of factors that inform the Court’s
docket.  That is, the Court’s membership as well as the rules the Justices
impose upon themselves assuredly influence which appeals are selected for
Court review and, in so doing, resolve the question about how many appeals
11 See Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1276 tbl.2.
12 Id. at 1275.
13 See id. at 1283 (“[T]he Court will continue to decide relatively few cases per Term
unless the political landscape changes.”).  To be fair, the authors also write that they do
not believe that “ideology alone accounts for the Court’s docket shifts.” Id. at 1284.
14 See id. at 1258.  These repeat players include various members of the Supreme Court
bar and the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office.
15 See id. at 1284.
16 See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Ple-
nary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 776–90 (2001) (exploring the influence of
changes to the Court’s membership); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehn-
quist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 417–19 (focusing on the reduced number of cases in
which the United States sought plenary review).
17 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1270.
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are selected each Term.  It is difficult to overstate the importance of case
selection and, as well, the potential impact of the Court’s internal “rule of
four.”  The particular strategic import of the Court’s “rule of four” is well
understood by the Justices themselves as well as others.  As Professors Kur-
land and Hutchinson observed, “[t]he rule of four is a device by which a
minority of the Court can impose on the majority a question that the major-
ity does not think it appropriate to address.”18
One additional internal mechanism, activated during the 1972 Term
(principally during calendar year 1973),19 involved the cert pool, which, as
Owens and Simon describe, was justified as a “time-saving mechanism for the
Justices’ chambers” as they sorted through petitions.20  This characterization
of the cert pool as an administrative “time saver” comports with data on
annual volume of certiorari petitions.  In 1940, the total number of certiorari
petitions the Court had to review was 977; by the 1972 Term, when the cert
pool practice was implemented, the number of certiorari petitions had
increased by almost 400% (3794).21  While few scholars disagree that the cert
pool has introduced some degree of administrative efficiency, what scholars
do contest, however, is the degree to which (if at all) the emergence of the
cert pool itself influences the total number of appeals the Court decides to
resolve each Term.22
2. External Factors
In addition to internal Court-controlled factors, such as the cert pool,
other factors residing wholly outside of the Court’s control can also influence
how many appeals the Court decides to resolve.  One obvious external factor
18 Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, O.T.
1982, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 628, 645 (1983).  Perhaps notably, former Justice Stevens observed
that approximately twenty-five percent of appeals that proceeded to the Court’s discuss list
were granted certiorari with only four votes. See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-
Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1983).  Of course, as Professors Revesz and Karlan
point out, because a majority of Justices can vote to dismiss a case as improvidently granted
after oral argument, a “grant of certiorari is not irrevocable.”  Richard L. Revesz & Pamela
S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1082 (1988).
19 Barbara Palmer, The “Bermuda Triangle?” The Cert Pool and Its Influence over the
Supreme Court’s Agenda, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 105, 107 & n.8 (2001).
20 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1235.
21 Indeed, one year later the number increased further to 4187. Supreme Court
Caseloads, 1880–2015, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-
maps/supreme-court-caseloads-1880-2015 (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
22 Compare David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-
Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 160 (2010) (indicating that one possible
explanation for the decrease in plenary review is the increase in the number of Justices
using the cert pool), and David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 972 (2007) (book review) (arguing that
the cert pool’s emergence may have contributed to the Court’s docket decline), with Cor-
dray & Cordray, supra note 16, at 791 (arguing that the cert pool has not had much system-
atic influence on the number of appeals the Court agrees to decide).
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includes adjustments by Congress to the Court’s jurisdiction.  The clearest
example of this during the time period of our study involves the Supreme
Court Case Selections Act of 1988.23  This legislation resulted in the removal
of virtually all of the Court’s remaining mandatory jurisdiction.  Diminishing
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, in turn, afforded the Justices almost total
freedom in selecting the appeals that they wanted to hear and decide.24
Of course, reductions in the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction do not nec-
essarily lead to reductions in the Court’s docket.  After all, while the Act had
the net effect of eliminating a stream of appeals that mandatory jurisdiction
required the Court take up, it does not inexorably follow that a net reduction
in mandatory jurisdiction appeals means fewer appeals for the Court to hear.
Indeed, nothing in the Act prevents the Court from replacing the volume of
appeals that the Court no longer must hear with granting additional discre-
tionary appeals that it wants to decide.
While nothing in the Supreme Court Case Selections Act, either on its
face or in operation, necessarily compels a reduction in the Court’s docket
size, the net effect of the Act’s implementation, as Court docket trend lines
imply, corresponds with a reduction in the total number of appeals decided
by the Court.  As Figures 1 and 2 make clear, beginning approximately one
year following the Act’s implementation, the Court’s docket size began to
drop palpably and consistently for approximately one decade.25
3. Intercourt and Intra-Court Ideological Dispersion
The scholarly focus on ideological dispersion as a factor that influences
the number of appeals the Court decides each Term divides into two broad
dimensions: intercourt and intra-Court.  Intercourt ideological dispersion,
construed as the distance between the median Justice’s Judicial Common
Space (JCS) score and the median circuit court’s JCS score, is frequently
framed in principal-agent theory.26  The theory’s impulse and implications in
this context are relatively straightforward.  From its perch at the top of the
judicial hierarchy and to the extent that the Court’s role includes resolving
splits between or among circuits as well as correcting erroneous circuit deci-
sions, one could reasonably expect that the Court’s need to “clean up” circuit
23 Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
24 For a discussion, see, for example, Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme
Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81 (1988); and Megan Reilly, Note, Is the
Supreme Court’s Virtually Complete Discretion in Certiorari Decisions as Afforded by Congress in the
Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988 Ethical, and What Potential Ethical Ramifications Stem
from Such Control?, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1299 (2016).
25 Prior empirical studies of slightly different research questions, however, did not
detect a diminished Court docket attributable to the Supreme Court Case Selections Act.
See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 16, at 412.
26 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1245–51; see also Tracey E. George & Albert H.
Yoon, The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 825–31
(2003) (analyzing intercourt ideological dispersion’s effect on docket size using the princi-
pal-agent theory).
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decisions (or “splits”) or “supervise” lower courts decreases as the ideological
distance between the Court and circuits decreases.27
A second dimension explores intra-Court ideological dispersion, opera-
tionalized as the distance between the Court’s most conservative and liberal
Justices’ Martin-Quinn scores.  This particular influence, intra-Court ideolog-
ical dispersion across the Justices, certainly warrants attention as it is the Jus-
tices themselves, through their individual votes on certiorari petitions, who
directly control the Court’s docket.  What is implied by attention to intra-
Court ideological cohesion is that as the Court’s ideological cohesion
decreases so, too, will the Court’s appetite to decide appeals.  That is, a
decrease in the Court’s ideological cohesion should correspond with a
decrease in the number of appeals the Court agrees to decide.
B. How to Understand a Diminishing Court Docket?
Despite increased scholarly attention to the Court’s docket size and
changes to it, does the total number of appeals decided by the Court each
Term—let alone variation in this number over time and across Court
Terms—matter?  Or, assuming that the descriptive accounts of the Court’s
diminishing docket over time are accurate, as an interpretative matter what
should one make of it?
Owens and Simon, similar to many scholars (particularly, but not limited
to, legal scholars), paint a dim normative picture resulting from a diminished
Court docket.  Specifically, they identify four particular problems hastened
by the Court’s decreased appetite for deciding appeals.28  One such problem
is that as the Court decides fewer appeals it necessarily leaves more legal
questions “undecided.”29  A second problem, perhaps conceptually related
to the first, is that a reduced Court docket may contribute to the Court
becoming more “out of touch,” at least, perhaps, as it relates to legal develop-
ment.30  Third, to the extent that the Court decides fewer appeals, and par-
ticularly so in various discrete legal areas (e.g., copyright), Owens and Simon
argue that those fewer appeals will increasingly be handled by the emergence
of an elite Supreme Court bar that is dominated by a small handful of lead-
ing large law firms (and these law firms’ significant corporate client bases).31
Finally, a diminished Court docket could likewise subdue the Court’s legiti-
macy as a constitutional institution over time, or at least, perhaps, public per-
ceptions of the Court’s legitimacy.32
27 For one critique of the application of the principal-agent theory in the context of
Court and court relations, see Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the
Judicial Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 552–71 (2011).
28 See Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1251–63.
29 Id. at 1252–54.
30 Id. at 1254–56.
31 Id. at 1256–60; see, e.g., Kedar S. Bhatia, Top Supreme Court Advocates of the Twenty-First
Century, 2 J.L. (1 J. LEGAL METRICS) 561, 570–72 tbl.A (2012) (listing lawyers who argued
five or more appeals in the Supreme Court during OT 2000–12).
32 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1260–63.
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To be sure, while the somewhat grim picture painted by Owens and
Simon (and others) certainly reflects the weight of scholarly opinion, dissent-
ing voices also exist.  Notably among those who offer alternative interpreta-
tions is U.S. Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, who argues that a decline
in the Court’s docket size does not raise concerns and, even if it did, any such
concerns are self-correcting.33  Moreover, Judge Wilkinson goes on to argue
that many of the reforms seeking to address potential harms flowing from a
decreasing Court docket, including calls for the Court to take on more
appeals, will likely do more harm than good.34
C. Why “Replication” Studies Matter
The need for greater attention to replication studies has increased over
time; indeed, attention to this topic has exploded recently not only among
academics but also in the popular media as well.  Much of the current atten-
tion, likely sparked by a “crisis” in clinical psychology, has cast exceedingly
harsh light on various scholarly fields and subfields.35  The emergence of
problems associated with the systematic inability to “replicate” numerous
studies has resulted in, among other things, forced early retirements for
senior academics36 and increased public “scorn” directed at various scholarly
fields and disciplines.37  Moreover, noteworthy “failures to replicate” helped
fuel the establishment of well-funded labs whose principal focus is to repli-
cate published empirical social science.38
Prompted partly by the academy’s renewed attention to and focus on
replication, this Article seeks to contribute to a growing “replication” litera-
ture by replicating, as well as updating and expanding upon, the most recent,
comprehensive, and leading empirical examination of the Court’s diminish-
ing docket, published by Professors Owens and Simon in 2012.  Owens and
Simon’s paper sets out to explore the degree to which ideological differences
33 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If It Ain’t Broke . . ., 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67, 71–72 (2010)
(arguing that a declining Court docket size does not raise problems and, if it did, any
problems would be self-correcting).
34 Id. at 67.
35 See, e.g., Open Sci. Collaboration, Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,
349 SCIENCE 943 (2015).
36 See, e.g., Tom Bartlett, As Cornell Finds Him Guilty of Academic Misconduct, Food
Researcher Will Retire, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/As-Cornell-Finds-Him-Guilty-of/244584; James Hamblin, A Credibility Crisis in Food
Science, ATLANTIC (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/09/
what-is-food-science/571105/.
37 See, e.g., Scott O. Lilienfeld, Psychology’s Replication Crisis and the Grant Culture: Right-
ing the Ship, 12 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 660, 660 (2017); D. Stephen Lindsay, Replication in
Psychological Science, 26 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1827, 1827 (2015).
38 Open Sci. Collaboration, supra note 35, at 950; Our Mission, CTR. FOR OPEN SCI.,
https://cos.io/about/mission/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).  The Center for Open Science,
located near the University of Virginia, includes various research projects spanning an
array of scholarly fields, such as the “Reproducibility Project: Psychology.” Reproducibility
Project: Psychology, OSF, https://osf.io/ezcuj/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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between the Supreme Court and lower federal appellate courts informed the
Court’s docket over time, while simultaneously accounting for the prior
major theories.39  In this spirit, we set out to independently replicate Owens
and Simon’s original findings, update their study with data from nine addi-
tional Court Terms, and expand their work through alternative variables as
well as models.40
III. DATA, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND METHODOLOGY
To test the various competing hypotheses relating to the Supreme
Court’s docket size, we draw on three distinct though related data sources.
One important data source includes the Supreme Court Database, created by
Professor Harold Spaeth and now actively updated and maintained under
Professor Lee Epstein’s supervision.41  This data set supplies, among other
information, the number of annual Court decisions generated each Term.42
While the Spaeth-Epstein Supreme Court database is widely used,43 especially
among political scientists, and criticized,44 the database’s well-known main
limitations are not particularly germane to the analyses in our study.
A. Dependent Variable: The Number of Court Decisions by Term
The term “Supreme Court decision” warrants a bit more specification,
particularly as it serves as this study’s dependent variable.  To facilitate com-
parisons across past studies and time, we adopted Professors Owens and
Simon’s construction of the term.  That is, we construe Court decisions to
include only those that derived from a case that was orally argued and
culminated in a signed or per curiam opinion or a judgment of the Court.45
As Figure 1 illustrates, our dependent variable ranges from a low of 68 (2017
Term) to a high of 215 (1940 Term).
39 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1224, 1284–85.
40 We wish to specifically acknowledge Owens and Simon’s collegiality and contribu-
tions to our study.  Consistent with the scholarly enterprise in its purest form, both Profes-
sors Owens and Simon were gracious in sharing their original data set as well as responding
to periodic questions throughout our study.
41 See SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Feb. 14,
2020).  The full list of current contributors to this invaluable data set includes: Harold
Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Ted Ruger, Sara Benesh, Jeffrey Segal, and Andrew Martin (version
2018, Release 2.0). The Contributors, SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase
.org/about.php?s=3 (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
42 While the current (and most recent) United States Supreme Court Database
includes data from the 1946 through the 2017 Terms, Professors Owens and Simon kindly
shared docket information for the 1940 through 1945 Terms.
43 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President, 45
J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 408 (2016).
44 See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of
the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (2008).
45 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1270.
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B. Independent Variables: Ideological and Nonideological
The factors hypothesized to influence the number of Court decisions
across Terms can be organized into two broad groups of independent vari-
ables: ideological and nonideological.
1. Ideological Factors
The influence of ideological factors on the Court’s docket size is con-
strued in two related—though distinct—dimensions.  One dimension
involves ideological cohesion among the Justices on the Supreme Court.  A
second dimension focuses on ideological gaps between the Supreme Court
and the various federal circuit courts, from which the Court draws a sizable
portion of its docket.
a. Intra-Court Ideological Distance
As ideological cohesion, in various directions and across various institu-
tions, is of particular concern, we exploit the oft-used Martin-Quinn score
estimates.46  The Martin-Quinn scores reflect a Bayesian modeling method
that exploits the Justices’ votes to estimate their latent ideological prefer-
ences.47  The scores are updated annually, and this study uses the 2017 Mar-
tin-Quinn scores.48
Following Owens and Simon’s study, intra-Court ideological cohesion is
operationalized by computing an ideological-range score for the Court each
Term.  The ideological-range score is the absolute value of the difference
between the minimum and maximum Martin-Quinn scores for the Justices.
More specifically, intra-Court ideological cohesion is understood as the gap
between the Court’s most liberal and conservative Justices for each Term.49
Thus, we expect that a decrease in the Court’s ideological-range score (that is,
as intra-Court ideological cohesion increases), will correspond with an
increase in the Court’s docket size.  Conversely, we expect a more ideologi-
cally heterogeneous Court to accept, review, and decide fewer appeals.
b. Intercourt Ideological Distance
Along with the influence of ideological cohesion among the Supreme
Court Justices, ideological cohesion between the Court and the federal cir-
cuits is also expected to inform variation in the Court’s docket size.  As
46 For a general description see, for example, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn,
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court,
1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 135 (2002).  To access the most recent (2018) Martin-
Quinn Justice data files, see Measures, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.lsa.umich
.edu/measures.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
47 Martin & Quinn, supra note 46, at 135.
48 Owing to Martin-Quinn score updating, the Martin-Quinn score values we use in
our study differ slightly from those used by Owens and Simon in their 2012 study.
49 See Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1272.
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Owens and Simon hypothesized, as the degree of ideological separation
between the Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts increases, we
expect a corresponding increase in the Court’s docket size.  Conversely, we
expect the Court to take on comparatively fewer appeals when it is ideologi-
cally closer to the federal circuits.50
To assess this hypothesis we exploit the annual Judicial Common Space
(JCS) scores.  JCS scores provide researchers with a common metric to com-
paratively assess ideal points for Justices as well as federal circuit judges.
From these, one can explore intercourt ideological variation and, critical to
this study, ideological distance.  More specifically, for each Term we identi-
fied the median Justice’s JCS score as well as the mean of the circuit courts’
median JCS scores.  We construe the intercourt ideological range for each
Court Term as the absolute value of the difference between these two scores.
Insofar as this Article sets out to expand Owens and Simon’s paper, we
also consider in alternative specifications an alternative measure of
intercourt ideological dispersion that focuses on circuit outliers rather than
midpoints.  Specifically, we crafted a new variable that derives from the abso-
lute value of the distance between the median Justice’s JCS score and the
median JCS score from that circuit court located furthest from the Court’s
ideological “center.”  Our impulse here pivots on the notion that to the
extent that the Court strives to achieve “error correction” (among the cir-
cuits), such an error correction impulse may be more efficaciously reflected
by focusing on the ideological space between the Court’s midpoint and the
circuit court median that is most “distant” from the Court.  One would
expect, ex ante, that as the ideological gap between the Court’s midpoint
and the most ideologically distant circuit court increases, so too will the
Court’s docket size.
One small technical wrinkle, incident to our use of the dynamic Martin-
Quinn and JCS scores, warrants brief explanation.  Given that Martin-Quinn
and JCS scores update periodically, this study updates Owens and Simon’s
2012 study with the benefit of the most recent scores as well as expands it by
including data through the 2017 Term.  The dynamic nature of the Martin-
Quinn and JCS scores’ updating, however, precludes us from a literal replica-
tion of Owens and Simon’s 2012 study.
2. Nonideological Factors
When modeling Court outcomes, scholars across various fields under-
standably tend to focus on the role of “judicial ideology.”  And, to be sure,
ideology has been found to exert important influences in many court stud-
ies.51  That said, despite ideology’s acknowledged role in Court outcomes,
50 Id. at 1248.
51 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 260–63
(1995); James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward
Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
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few judicial or court scholars believe that ideology is the only independent
variable warranting attention.52  As such, and consistent with Owens and
Simon’s prior work, our models include various nonideological variables that
have either been previously found or hypothesized (or both) as salient to
variation in the Court’s docket size over time.  These variables include the
Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, the emergence of the certiorari
pool, and Justice White’s somewhat notable penchant and appetite for the
Court to hear and decide appeals, especially those involving circuit splits.53
Insofar as our Article seeks to expand Owens and Simon’s 2012 work, we
also consider an additional nonideological variable in supplemental analyses:
the annual total number of the certiorari petitions filed by petitioners each
Term (lagged by one Term).54  We explore this variable because the Court’s
docket is drawn from the universe of certiorari petitions filed, and variation
in the number of certiorari petitions may influence the number of appeals
the Court decides to hear and decide.  We lag the certiorari petitions filed
variable to adjust for the practical reality that to the extent that certiorari
petitions may influence the Court’s docket size, any such influence will likely
flow from the volume of certiorari petitions filed in the prior Term.
Of course, even if the motivation for considering certiorari petitions is
persuasive, we remain mindful that some degree of censoring concerns
arises.  Left-side censoring, in theory anyway, could fall to zero.  That is,
despite its obvious unlikeliness, it remains theoretically possible that the
Court could simply decline to decide any appeals in a given Term.  To be
sure, this has never happened, and, in reality, any left-side censoring is likely
to land somewhere greater than zero.  Indeed, across the seventy-eight years
included in our study the Court has never decided fewer than 68 appeals (in
2017).
Potential right-side censoring also exists.  After all, the Court’s business
is conducted by no more than nine Justices, and practical limits attach to the
amount of work (appeals decided) that nine Justices can be reasonably
expected to complete each Term.  While technological advances since 1940
as well as various increases in the number of clerks assigned to each Justice
over time surely inform the Court’s judicial capacity for deciding appeals, the
uppermost bound during the course of this study was 215 decisions (in
1675, 1713–20 (1999); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1678–86 (1998); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael
Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1465–70 (1998).
52 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1640, 1645 (2003); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology:
Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 747–59 (2005)
(summarizing the academic, judicial, and public debates on the legal and ideological influ-
ences on judicial outcomes).
53 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1235 (cert pool), 1242 (Justice White), 1267
(Supreme Court Case Selection Act).
54 Specific methodological complexities incident to including annual certiorari peti-
tions are described more fully below. See infra Section IV.C.
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1940).  Despite the practical censoring concerns pointing in both directions,
to the extent that size variations in the universe of petitions from which the
Court draws its docket may inform the Court’s docket size, it is a factor that
warrants attention.
Heightening our sense that certiorari petitions warrant attention is how
they and the Court’s actual docket size covaried over the period of our study.
Figure 3 illustrates the relation between the Court’s docket size and the num-
ber of certiorari petitions filed over time.  In the “dual-axis” figure, the axis
on the left scales the number of certiorari petitions (represented with a bro-
ken line) each Term; the axis on the right scales the number of appeals
decided by the Court (represented with a solid line).55  While the pattern
conveyed in Figure 3 implies a relation between these two variables, it is an
unexpected relation.  Specifically, what is implied by Figure 3, on balance,
resembles something close to an inverse relation (again, potentially distorted
a bit by the dual-axis scaling).
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF APPEALS DECIDED BY THE COURT AND CERTIORARI
PETITIONS FILED, 1940–2017 TERMS
Sources: U.S. Supreme Court Database (2018), Owens and Simon (2012) (updated), and
Federal Judicial Center (2018).
55 Please note the different scales in the left and right axes.  Also, the data relating to
the number of appeals decided by the Court in Figure 3 are also presented in Figure 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 16 15-APR-20 15:37
1580 notre dame law review [vol. 95:4
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We present results from our efforts to replicate and update (in Table 1)
as well as expand upon (in Table 2) Owens and Simon’s prior work.  While
Owens and Simon explored the influence of five factors on the Court’s
docket size, we broadened the scope of the inquiry by exploring the influ-
ence of alternative and additional variables in our Article as well as multiple
models.
A. Results: Replication and Updates
As it relates to our initial and narrow replication task, Model 1 in Table 1
presents results from our effort that most closely traces Owens and Simon’s
empirical strategy in their 2012 paper.  Specifically, this model specification
uses Owens and Simon’s original list of variables and is limited to their
period of study (1940–2008).56  Insofar as the dependent variable of inter-
est—the total number of Supreme Court decisions by Term—is plausibly
construed as a “count” variable, results from Model 1 (and Models 2 and 3)
derive from a negative binomial regression model, clustered on Court Term.
As results in Model 1 in Table 1 make clear, our findings largely track—and
thus essentially successfully “replicate”—Owens and Simon’s 2012 results.57
Beyond the narrow task of replicating Owens and Simon’s published
results, our Article also seeks to update Owens and Simon’s work.  We do so
by extending the scope of the study to include updated data from additional
Court Terms (1940–2015).  To this end, Model 2’s specification replicates
that of Model 1 with one critical difference.  Specifically, Model 2 expands
the scope of the study to include data from additional Court Terms
(1940–2015).
From an interpretative standpoint, results in Model 2 set the stage for
similar results derived from alternative specifications.  In particular, in Model
2 the additional Court Terms do little, and nothing of note, to all of the
independent variables save for one—the intercourt ideological distance vari-
able falls out of statistical significance.58  Consequently, from the narrow per-
spective of ideological “distance,” results in Model 2 imply that it is the
ideological “distance” within the Court (and across the various Justices),
along with other control variables (discussed below) that accounts for varia-
tion in the number of appeals the Court decides each term.  Or, more specif-
ically, and as hypothesized, in terms of ideological distance what is critical is
that as the ideological heterogeneity of the Court increases (that is, as the
“distance” separating the Court’s most liberal and conservative Justices
increases), the number of appeals the Court will decide decreases.
Beyond replicating and updating, however, we also expand on Owens
and Simon’s initial work partly by introducing an alternative measure of an
56 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1270–75.
57 Id. at 1276 tbl.2.
58 Notably, Moffett et al.’s study of the Court’s docket from 1946 to 2005 similarly
found no intercourt influence. See Moffett et al., supra note 8, at 34.
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intercourt ideological distance.  In the prior models (Models 1 and 2 in
Table 1), intercourt ideological distance is construed in terms of the “dis-
tance” between the Court’s median Justice and the median circuit JCS score.
In Model 3, by contrast, we consider ideological “distance” between the
Court’s median Justice and the JCS in terms of the most divergent circuit.
Whatever one may feel about how to best operationalize ideological distance
between the Court and the federal circuits, however, in neither approach
(Model 2 or 3) did the intercourt ideological distance variable achieve statis-
tical significance.
The absence of statistical significance for the intercourt ideological dis-
tance variable, however operationalized, stands in stark contrast with the per-
sistently significant influence exerted by intra-Court ideological distance.
That is, to the extent that ideological distance mattered in terms of influenc-
ing the number of appeals decided by the Court each Term, it was distance
among the Court’s Justices that mattered rather than any ideological distance
between the Court and the federal circuits.
B. Important Factors Other than Ideology
As discussed above, as it relates to the influence of ideology—as variously
operationalized—the findings presented in Table 1 (Models 2 and 3) diverge
from Owens and Simon’s 2012 findings mainly due to the persistent salience
of intra-Court rather than intercourt ideological influences.  While the
absence of a systematic intercourt ideological difference in Models 2 and 3
represents an important departure from Owens and Simon’s original find-
ings, the influence of other nonideological factors largely persists across the
various model specifications and, as such, warrants brief discussion.
1. Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Supreme Court Case
Selections Act’s downward influence on the Court’s docket size.  Results from
all three models in Table 1 illustrate the Supreme Court Case Selections Act’s
persistent and strong downward influence on the number of appeals the
Court decided each Term.  Prior to the Act’s implementation the Court’s
average docket size between the 1940 and 1988 Terms was 153.5.  After hold-
ing all else in our estimation constant, the effect of the Supreme Court Case
Selections Act’s passage on the Court’s docket size was a reduction to 82.3
appeals per Term.  That is, owing to the Supreme Court Case Selections Act’s
passage in 1988, the Court, on average, decided 71.2 fewer appeals per Term
than before the Act’s passage.59
59 To model Owens and Simon’s 2012 paper as closely as possible, the predicted values
calculations derive from the negative binomial regression estimation reported in Model 2
(Table 1), which best reflects Owens and Simon’s original estimation updated by our data
from an additional nine Court Terms.  The predicted values calculations were produced by
Stata’s “prvalue” command (v.14.1).  The predicted values were calculated while holding
all continuous values at their mean and the binomial variables at their modal values.
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2. Justice White
Justice White enjoyed a well-earned reputation for his desire and com-
mitment to “clean up” splits and conflicts between and among various circuit
courts.60  His desire exerted an upward influence on the number of appeals
the Court took and decided.  When Justice White was on the Court, the
model predicts that it will decide, on average, 180.6 appeals per Term.  When
Justice White was not on the Court, the predicted docket size decreases to
153.5.  The docket size difference attributable to Justice White’s presence on
the Court is a net increase of, on average, 27.1 appeals per Term.61  As the
results in Table 1 illustrate, however, the statistical significance of Justice
White’s influence—increasing the average number of Court decisions each
Term—does not persist across all specifications.  While any “Justice White”
effect proved somewhat less forceful and persistent than that exerted by the
Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Justice White’s influence on the
number of Court decisions nonetheless likely deserves attention.
TABLE 1: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS OF THE NUMBER OF
APPEALS DECIDED BY THE COURT, BY TERM (1940–2015)
1 2 3
Ideology:
Intra-Court ideological dist. -0.03* -0.03** -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercourt ideological dist. -0.76** -0.27
(0.17) (0.23) —
Intercourt ideological dist. -0.13
—furthest Cir. — — (0.20)
Nonideology Factors:
Case Selections Act, 1988 -0.44** -0.57** -0.53**
(0.06) (0.12) (0.12)
Cert pool review 0.08 0.09 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Justice White 0.14* 0.17* 0.15
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
Total cert petitions filed (lag) — — —
Constant 5.22** 5.20** 5.17**
(0.08) (0.13) (0.18)
(N) 68 76 76
Source: Owens & Simon (2012) (updated).
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p<0.05; **p<0.01.  We estimated the models
using the “nbreg” command in Stata (v.16.1).
60 Such an impulse is almost assuredly Sisyphean insofar as (former) Judge Starr esti-
mated that there are “‘approximately 400’ circuit splits each year.” See Starr, supra note 4,
at 1372 (quoting Cordray & Cordray, supra note 16, at 772).
61 Owens and Simon reported similar findings regarding Justice White’s influence on
the Court’s docket size. See Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1281 fig.7.
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C. Model Expansion: Certiorari Petitions Filed
Though not considered by Owens and Simon, we felt it possible that
variation in the size of the universe of certiorari petitions filed in the Court
each year (lagged by one year) may inform the number of appeals the Court
takes and decides.62  We also felt that the dependent variable is more usefully
understood with respect to the total number of certiorari petitions filed in
the Court each year.  Accordingly, in alternative specifications we include an
exposure variable.  Our decision to expand Owens and Simon’s study in
these ways, however, necessitated important modifications to our empirical
strategy.
The emergence of both the Case Selections Act in 1988 and the Court’s
cert pool practice responded to, in some degree, general and growing con-
cerns over the steady increase in the number of certiorari petitions filed over
time.  Insofar as our new control variable of interest—the total number of
certiorari petitions filed, lagged by one year—motivated not only the passage
of the Case Selections Act in 1988 but also the emergence of the Court’s cert
pool practice, we concluded that multicollinearity concerns necessitated
removing the Case Selections Act of 1988 and cert pool dummy variables
from alternative models that included the certiorari petitions variable.
A second change to our empirical strategy involves the model itself.  In
Owens and Simon’s original work, which, importantly, does not consider how
variation in the number of certiorari petitions may inform the Court’s docket
size, their selection of a negative binomial regression model was appropriate,
especially given the basic “count” character of the dependent variable (total
number of appeals decided by the Court by Term) and given the negative
binomial regression model’s ability to adjust for overdispersion (that is, when
the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean).  However, the
threat posed by overdispersion may be inflated, the inclusion of an exposure
variable (total number of certiorari petitions filed in the Court each Term)
may supply helpful context to the dependent variable, and the number of
certiorari petitions, lagged by one year, may serve as a useful control variable
for the model.
To better explore how the total number of certiorari petitions filed
(lagged by one year) may influence the Court’s docket size, we consider two
separate approaches.  Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 present results from nega-
tive binomial regression models modified to include an exposure variable
(total number of certiorari petitions filed each Term).  Negative binomial
regression may also be appropriate for rate data, where the rate is a count of
events divided by some measure of that unit’s exposure (a particular unit of
observation).  In particular, the rate is the docket size divided by certiorari
petitions filed in any given Court Term.  In negative binomial regression this
is handled as an offset, where the exposure variable enters on the right-hand
62 We lagged the certiorari petitions control variable by one year because we hypothe-
size that if certiorari petitions indeed inform the Court’s docket size, it would be the num-
ber of certiorari petitions filed in the year prior.
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side of the equation, but with a parameter estimate (for log(exposure)) con-
strained to 1.  The exposure variable is important, as it sets the upper bound-
ary for the dependent variable.  That is, if one assumes that the Court is
functionally limited to granting certiorari only to appeals that filed a petition
for certiorari, then the number of certiorari petitions filed each year defines
the dependent variable’s upper limit.  Another virtue of our alternative mod-
eling approach is that it accounts for potential distortions introduced by time
trends in our panel data.63
Results presented in Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 converge on at least two
key points.  First, and once again, to the extent that ideological distance mat-
ters at all (in Model 2), it is only intra-Court ideological distance that was
salient.  Second, consistent with what is implied at the descriptive level in
Figure 3, certiorari petitions exerted an important effect on the models.  In
terms of the Bayesian information criterion (BIC),64 as between the two neg-
ative binomial models we considered (Models 1 and 2), Model 2 is preferred
(albeit slightly), thus highlighting our alternative measure of intercourt ideo-
logical distance.
Of course, including an exposure variable (as we do in Models 1 and 2)
introduces further methodological wrinkles.  Specifically, modifying the orig-
inal negative binomial regression model to include an exposure variable (cer-
tiorari petitions) plausibly transforms the character of the dependent
variable so that it is now better understood as the number of Court decisions
out of the total number of certiorari petitions.  If so, then this understanding
of the dependent variable may be better approached as a binomial outcome
rather than a traditional “count.”  And, if so, the negative binomial regres-
sion model’s comparative advantages may no longer be especially apt.
To explore this methodological possibility—and to better assess the core
results’ robustness across different model specifications—we considered a
binomial regression model, and results from two specifications are presented
in Models 3 and 4.  While results in Models 3 and 4, similar to those gener-
ated by different models (along with the results presented in Table 1),
emphasize the persistent and particular salience of ideological dispersion
across the Supreme Court Justices, it is worth noting that, for the first time
since replicating Owens and Simon’s 2012 results (Table 1, Model 1),
intercourt ideological dispersion achieves statistical significance (Table 2,
Model 4).  Finally, in terms of BIC, as between the two binomial regression
models (Models 3 and 4), Model 4 is preferred.
63 For alternative approaches toward a possible risk posed by stationarity in the depen-
dent variable, see, for example, Moffett et al., supra note 8, at 31 (describing an error-
correction model as one “conservative” approach).  As it relates to negative binomial mod-
els’ implications for possible time-trend data, see generally A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K.
TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA 263–303 (2d ed. 2013).
64 See generally Adrian E. Raftery, Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research, 25 SOC.
METHODOLOGY 111 (1995).  Lower BIC values indicate a better fitting model. See id. at
133–34.
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TABLE 2: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION AND BINOMIAL REGRESSION
MODELS OF THE NUMBER OF APPEALS DECIDED BY THE COURT,
BY TERM (1940–2015)
1 2 3 4
Ideology:
Intra-Court ideological dist. -0.02 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercourt ideological dist. 0.14 0.23
(0.22) — (0.22) —
Intercourt ideological dist. 0.28 0.34*
—furthest Cir. — (0.15) — (0.16)
Nonideology Factors:
Case Selections Act, 1988 — — — —
Cert pool review — — — —
Justice White -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Total cert petitions filed (lag) -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.74** -1.91** -1.66** -1.83**
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
BIC 727.31 725.37 150.10 138.68
(N) 75 75 75 75
Model:
Negative Binomial Regression ✓ ✓
Binomial Regression ✓ ✓
Source: Owens & Simon (2012) (updated).
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p < 0.05; ** p< 0.01.  We estimated Models
1 and 2 using the “nbreg” command; Models 3 and 4 using the “binreg” command in Stata
(v.16.1).
D. Discussion, Implications, and Limitations
The cumulative weight of these findings implies that a slight—though
perceptible—shift in the source of ideological influences from what Owens
and Simon described in 2012 is warranted.  Specifically, while Owens and
Simon’s results emphasize ideological gaps across the Justices (intra-Court
gaps) and ideological gaps separating the federal circuit courts and the
Supreme Court (intercourt gaps), results in our study, on balance, suggest
narrowing the interpretative focus to intra-Court ideological gaps across the
Justices rather than intercourt gaps between the Supreme Court and federal
circuit courts.  Moreover, as a comparison between Tables 1 and 2 implies,
these core ideological findings display some degree of persistence across mul-
tiple (but not all) specifications of the negative binomial regression and
binomial regression models.  That is, on balance our core results appear
largely robust to model selection or specification.
What may explain the slightly divergent findings when it comes to ideo-
logical distance, especially in light of the many other findings that we share
with Owens and Simon?  We argue that it is not simply that our study benefits
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from data from additional Court Terms, but, and more importantly, it is what
may have specifically transpired during these additional years that deserves
close inspection.  While Owens and Simon’s paper includes Court Terms
1940–2008, and our Article includes Terms 1940–2017, between 2009 and
2017 only President Obama nominated federal judges and Supreme Court
Justices.  Indeed, during his administration President Obama’s 329 total con-
firmed Article III judicial nominations included two Supreme Court Justices
(Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were confirmed by the Senate in 2009 and
2010, respectively) and 55 circuit judges.65  Moreover, during his two terms
Obama enjoyed a Democrat-controlled Senate (and a “unified” federal gov-
ernment for purposes of judicial nominations) for all but two of his eight
years as president.
Thus, one critical change since Owens and Simon’s 2012 study—and
what helps distinguish their original data set from the updated data set used
in our study (along with the annually revised Martin-Quinn and JCS
scores)—involves contributions attributable to the addition of President
Obama’s 57 Court and circuit nominations.  To the extent that the judges
and Justices nominated by President Obama consistently reflect, more or less,
President Obama’s general judicial philosophy, it then follows that one
should expect that President Obama’s 57 judges and Justices contributed to a
net reduction of ideological “space” between the Court and the circuits.  To
put the point more concretely, the addition of data from nine Court Terms
that largely overlap with the Obama administration provides one plausible
explanation for why Owens and Simon’s finding of a statistically significant
influence exerted by intercourt ideological space falls out of statistical signifi-
cance in all but one of our models.
1. Do Intra- Versus Interideological Differences Matter, and, If So, What
Might They Imply?
While Owens and Simon emphasize intra-Court and intercourt ideologi-
cal distances, our findings emphasize the former and not the latter.  Does
this subtle change in the source of ideological distance raise any substantive
issues of import?
To the extent that ideological distance matters when it comes to explain-
ing variation in Court outcomes over time, greater precision regarding the
source of such distance also matters.  And this is perhaps especially true when
it comes to variation in the Court’s docket size over time.  That the Court
alone decides what appeals it will hear, our findings that intra-Court ideologi-
cal distance’s influence persists across the various models that we examined
65 Stephen B. Presser, Evaluating President Obama’s Appointments of Judges from a Con-
servative Perspective: What Did the Election of Donald Trump Mean for Popularity Sovereignty?, 60
HOW. L.J. 663, 664 (2017); see also Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www
.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (indicating that
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan were appointed by President Obama and confirmed
in 2009 and 2010, respectively).
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suggests that intra-Court factors will likely remain important to the Court’s
docket size going forward.  After all, the Court’s internal “rule of four”
impacts cert-granting decisions and strategy,66 and the Justices themselves
collectively exercise exclusive control over the Court’s discretionary appeals.
Consequently, the persistence of ideological distance among the Justices as
an important variable predicting the number of appeals the Court decides
during any given Term suggests that changes to Court membership or the
Justices’ evolving ideological preferences will be critical to any systematic
changes to the Court’s docket size going forward.
Resolving splits among circuit courts certainly remains salient to the
Court’s role as the nation’s highest court.  Moreover, while individual Jus-
tices’ commitment to cleaning up circuit disputes varies across Justices and
over time, this preference was especially acute for Justice White.67  However,
the emergence of circuit splits is just as likely a product of ideological dis-
tance (and other variables) among circuits rather than between the circuits
and the Court.  As well, while it remains a possibility that an individual Justice
(or Justices) systematically skew their cert-granting preferences and vote
toward resolving circuit splits, the one (modern) Justice (White) who was
especially committed to such certiorari petitions is no longer on the Court.
2. Regardless of the Source(s) of a Reduced Court Docket, Are the
Consequences from Fewer Court Decisions Necessarily Bad?
When it comes to discussions of the stark empirical reality of a declining
Supreme Court docket, the clear weight of scholarly commentary reacting to
changes in the Court’s docket size over time is palpably negative.68  Owens
and Simon, for example, identify four distinct negative consequences flowing
from a declining Court docket, including increasing legal uncertainty among
the lower federal courts and decreasing Court legitimacy.69
Despite such persistent dire warnings about the consequences flowing
from the Court’s decreased appetite for deciding appeals, however, perhaps
not all of the implications are negative.  That is, it remains at least possible
that some positive (or at least some nonnegative) aspects may flow from the
Court settling on a more modest role in American life (in terms of the raw
number of Court decisions).  Moreover, even if critiques of a reduced Court
role are, on net, persuasive, any such critiques would be strengthened by at
least acknowledging and considering possible benefits flowing from fewer
Court decisions.
The modest perspective advanced in this Article, however, is not without
precedent.  In a 2010 essay Judge Wilkinson, for example, pushed back
66 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
67 See supra subsection IV.B.2.
68 See, e.g., Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1251–63. But see Wilkinson, supra note 33
(arguing that a declining Court docket size does not raise problems, and, if it did, any
problems would be self-correcting).
69 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1251–63.
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against conventional wisdom and argued that suggestions to increase the
Court’s docket size were “wrong”70 and that even if the Court’s decreasing
docket size were a problem that warranted correction, it was a situation that
could be relied upon to “resolve itself.”71
a. One Logical Extension of Sunstein’s “Judicial Minimalism”
Doctrine
Professor Sunstein’s provocative and widely influential theory on mod-
ern Supreme Court decisionmaking, developed and refined over a number
of years, emphasized a growing conflict among Justices over the “sweep” of
their decisions.72  Broadly speaking, where judicial “minimalists,” according
to Sunstein, evidence a preference for narrow, case-by-case adjudication of
disputes, judicial “maximalists,” by contrast, prefer more expansive judicial
opinions that articulate broad rules for the future.  Moreover, disputes
between the judicial minimalists and maximalists, frequently pivoting on
debates about when the Court should “speak and when [it should] remain
silent,” Sunstein writes, dominate many Court struggles, and certainly begin
with the Rehnquist Court.73  While critics of Sunstein’s “judicial minimalism”
theory certainly exist, many of these critics are quick to concede the popular-
ity and importance of Sunstein’s thesis.74
Sunstein’s judicial minimalism theory and its impulse to “leave things
undecided” self-consciously hearkens back to Alexander Bickel’s “passive vir-
tues.”75  Indeed, particularly in the constitutional realm, as Sunstein implies,
some form of judicial minimalism may be advantageous as it may help redi-
rect the resolution of various issues to more democratic government institu-
tions.76  To the extent that judicial minimalism is desirable as a normative or
descriptive (or both) matter, a more extreme version of this theory is, rather
than agree to decide a case on the narrowest possible grounds, instead to
simply agree not to hear a case in the first case.
70 Wilkinson, supra note 33, at 67.
71 Id. at 71.
72 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353,
355–56 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4,
6–7 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 48–49.
73 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 72, at xi–xii.
74 Compare Jeffrey Rosen, Foreword, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1999), and Mark
Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration,
113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 92 (1999), with Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Mini-
malist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297, 2339 (2001) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note
72).
75 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–13 (2d ed. 1986). See generally Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, supra note 72.
76 Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1051 n.19 (2009).
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b. Implications from Brandeis’s “Laboratory of Democracy” Thesis
A related, though distinct, point from Sunstein’s “judicial minimalism”
theory as well as Bickel’s “passive virtues” observation hearkens back to a dis-
sent from Justice Brandeis.  In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,77 the Court
struck down an effort by the New State Ice Company, duly licensed by the
State of Oklahoma to engage in the ice business in that state, to preclude
Liebmann from entering the ice business without first obtaining the neces-
sary state license.  In his dissent, Justice Brandeis was far more willing to
afford states, such as Oklahoma, greater regulatory latitude when it came to
business regulation.78  In arguing that, in his opinion, Oklahoma’s Ice Act
(of 1925) sufficiently engaged with a “public” business, Justice Brandeis went
on to note that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”79
To be sure, Brandeis’s memorable “laboratory of democracy” point was
specifically directed to various state legislative activities rather than (state or
federal) judicial activity.  That said, might not a softer form of the argument
persuade with respect to, for example, some conflicts between or among cir-
cuits involving a contested legal issue?  Obviously, it is, of course, one of the
Supreme Court’s functions to “police” legal disputes across circuits.  At the
same time, few—if any—argue that the Court must immediately resolve all
such conflicts.  After all, the number of such conflicts—to say nothing of
their possible severity or import—almost assuredly exceeds the number of
appeals the Court can agree to resolve.80  Thus, the argument that a reduced
Court docket necessarily increases the number of unresolved circuit splits is
necessarily one of degree and not kind, so long as one concurrently assumes
that some level of discord among the circuits is inevitable as a practical
matter.
Moreover, as Professor Frost notes, a not-inconsequential percentage of
what “counts” as circuit splits are relatively “trivial” and externalize only mini-
mal costs on litigants.81  Thus, even if one argues that the Court should focus
on circuit splits when selecting appeals to hear, the relative and absolute
importance of circuit splits can vary, sometimes considerably in terms of the
costs these splits impose on litigants and legal doctrine.
Finally, even in situations where circuit splits may impose nontrivial costs
onto litigants or legal doctrine in terms of legal uncertainty, some of these
splits may possess virtues of their own, including contributing “fruitfully to
77 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932).
78 Id. at 310–11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  The key legal determination in the
Oklahoma statute involved the state’s finding that the business of ice production was a
“public” business. Id. at 271–74 (majority opinion).
79 Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
80 See generally Starr, supra note 4.
81 Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569, 1597–1600 (2008).
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the dialogic quality of federal law.”82  To the extent that any particular split
arises between two circuits, depending on the nature of such a split, perhaps
it might serve as a useful filtering mechanism for the Court to permit other
circuits to weigh in and allow the contested point to legally mature and per-
colate.  Indeed, perhaps subsequent circuit opinions taking sides on such a
dispute might identify a useful analytic approach or reasoning that could
both inform any subsequent Court resolution and, perhaps, even contribute
to and improve a subsequent Court’s resolution.
3. Model Selection
Our Article’s final contribution involves methodology.  Owens and
Simon specified a negative binomial regression model in their 2012 paper.83
Their model selection was unremarkable—even predictable—given the
“count” character of the dependent variable.  Indeed, such an approach
strikes us as intuitively plausible enough that our initial replication and
updating results, presented in Table 1, follow Owens and Simon’s lead and
adopt their methodological approach.
A negative binomial regression model is especially apt in situations
where a threat of overdispersion exists.  Admittedly, while assessments about
whether the observed variance is higher than what theory may predict is
largely a subjective decision, we note that the dependent variable’s observed
variance spans from a low of 68 to a high of 215.  It is certainly possible,
however, that the threat of overdispersion in this context may be inflated,
especially given how, as Figure 3 suggests, variation in the dependent variable
corresponds with variation in another independent variable, the universe of
certiorari petitions filed (the universe from which the dependent variable
derives).  And if the threat posed by the possibility of overdispersion recedes,
then models other than negative binomial regression become more
plausible.
Even if some level of an overdispersion threat persists, however, and the
negative binomial regression specification remains a viable alternative, at the
very least we feel the introduction of an exposure variable is a plausible alter-
native specification that warrants consideration.  Thus, one part of our meth-
odological contribution—the inclusion of an exposure variable prompted by
a desire to control for certiorari petitions filed—flows from our sense that
the dependent variable, the raw number of appeals decided by the Court
each Term, is more usefully understood once framed by the total number of
certiorari appeals filed in the Court each Term.
The inclusion of an exposure variable also plausibly transforms the char-
acter of the dependent variable so that it is now perhaps better understood as
the number of Court decisions out of the total number of certiorari petitions.
If so, such an understanding of the dependent variable may be better
approached as a binomial outcome rather than a traditional “count.”  And if
82 Wilkinson, supra note 33, at 69.
83 Owens & Simon, supra note 1, at 1275.
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the dependent variable may be characterized as something other than a pure
“count” variable, models other than negative binomial regression, including
a binomial regression model, emerge as a viable alternative.  We explore such
a possibility and compare results from these two models in Table 2.  More
important than our own methodological preferences, of course, is that the
results presented in Tables 1 and 2 appear, in the main, largely impervious to
model selection.  That is, our main results generally persist regardless of
model specification.
4. Limitations
While we remain comfortable with our results’ overall robustness, we
nonetheless remain mindful of limitations to our data and research design.
While Figures 1 and 2 clearly evidence an overall decline in the Supreme
Court’s docket since the post–World War II era, the slope of the downward
curve varies over the course of our study.  Future research may want to look
more closely at more granular, discrete time periods.  Another potential
aspect of interest for future research involves changes to the composition of
the types of appeals included in the annual certiorari petition pools as well as
possible changes in the types of appeals the Court agrees to hear and decide.
Finally, it is also likely that the Court’s certiorari grants from the federal cir-
cuit courts distribute unevenly across the federal circuits.  Closer examina-
tion of these distributional shifts, if any, may uncover additional wrinkles that
inform explanations for the Court’s diminishing appetite for deciding
appeals.
CONCLUSION
Various general trends, illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, on balance evi-
dence a palpable diminution in the Court’s appetite to decide appeals over
the past few decades and, more generally, since approximately the World
War I era.  Despite a persistent drop in the number of Court appeals decided
over time, by definition the velocity of this decline will eventually approach
zero as the number of Court decisions by Term cannot, by definition, fall
below zero.  That is, a natural limit bounds this decline.  Despite the natural
limit on how few appeals the Court can decide during any Term, far less
bounded, however, is the potential for future research that extends beyond
the relatively narrow timeframe of our study.  While clear docket size trend
patterns emerged prior to 1940 (as suggested in Figure 2), neither our nor
Owens and Simon’s study ventures into these earlier data.
Whatever general clarity—and academic consensus—exist on the broad
descriptive empirical point that the Court’s docket size has diminished over
time, somewhat less of a consensus exists on the various specific factors that
plausibly account for this decline.  And despite good-faith disagreements
about the independent contribution of any particular factor, the weight of
scholarly opinion characterizes the various consequences flowing from the
persistent drop in the number of Court decisions per Term in negative
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terms.  Whether such a characterization is warranted, however, is not entirely
clear.  A reduction in Court decisionmaking reflects a severe form of judicial
minimalism and plausibly contributes to “the dialogic quality of federal law.”
We take no strong normative position about the externalities that flow from a
reduced Court docket.  Our smaller point is simply that how best to charac-
terize these externalities remains an issue upon which reasonable minds
can—and do—differ.
